Abstract-Security protocols play a n important role in modern communications. However, security protocol development is a delicate task, and experience shows that computer security protocols are notoriously difficult to get right. Recently, Clark and Jacob provided a framework for automatic protocol generation based on combinatorial optimization techniques a n d the symmetric key p a r t of BAN logic. This paper shows how such a n approach c a n be further developed to encompass the full BAN logic without loss of efficiency a n d thereby synthesize public key protocols and hybrid protocols.
Protocols and Belief Logic
Security protocols are designed to let principals communicate securely over an insecure network. Security requirements usually include: secrecy, an intruder cannot read the contents of messages intended for others; authenticity, if a message appears to be from Alice for an identified purpose. then Alice, sent that message for that purpose; and non-repudiation, if Alice sent a message, she cannot later deny it. Many protocols are concerned with the authenticatcd establishment of session keys, which is typically necessary for the running of security protocols for most other purposes.
Anderson and Needham show that security protocol development is a delicate task, and computer security protocols are notoriously difficult to get right [AN96] . Recent approaches to use formal methods in the design of security protocols include finite-state model checking and belief logics. In this paper. we will concentrate on protocol security belief logics, which formalize what a principal may infer from messages received, taking as our example the first such logic, BAN [BAN89] , developed by Burrows, Abadi and Needham. Although their work has aroused much debate, the BAN logic is a milestone in the area of security protocol design and analysis. BAN logic focuses on the beliefs of honest parties involved in the.protocols and on the evolution of these beliefs as a consequence of communication.
The original BAN logic allows short, abstract proofs. It has identified some protocol flaws hut missed others [BM93] .
As a result, a number of variations and enhancements of the BAN logic have been developed. These new belief logics, such as GNY logic [GNY90] and SVO logic [SvO96] , address some weaknesses of BAN logic but sacrifice its simplicity.
Our aim is to show how meta-heuristic search can be used to evolve a wide range of security protocol designs that are provably correct with respect to the BAN logic. BAN logic has somewhat limited power but we believe the approach could easily be ported to other, more sophisticated logics. Below is a brief introduction to the notation and inference rules used in BAN logic.
Notions a n d Notations
Idealized Protocols In much of the literature, security protocols have not been expressed in a formal manner. Such descriptions must be convened to formal descriptions if formal analysis is to take place. In BAN logic literature the abstractions that are analyzed are termed idealized protocols.
In concrete protocols, principals maintain data items (e.g. keys) and communicate some of these items using messages with an agreed format. On receiving a message the receiver will update its state in some agreed way and carry out other agreed actions. With idealized protocols, principals maintain and communicate beliefs. Thus, rather than holding a key Kab for session communication between A and B and distributing that key to A and B , a server S would hold the belief that the key Kob was good for communicating between A and B (denoted A & B ) and include that belief in messages to A and B. The logic indicates how a receiver should update its belief states on receipt of a message. Encryption a n d Keys All messages in BAN lo,' ~I C are encrypted. Unencrypted messages sent over an insecure network provide no guarantees of any kind, because an intruder may easily alter cleartext. In practice, unencrypted concrete messages may be used as signals to cause encrypted messages to be sent, but they do not contribute to principals' beliefs. Since we work at the abstract BAN level some of our protocols have principals sending messages apparently without stimulus. Supplying such stimulus is a concrete inzplemenrarion issue.
Nonce All beliefs held in the current run of a protocol are stable for the entirety of the protocol; however, beliefs held in the past are not necessary carried forward into the present. Therefore, it is imponant for principals involved in a protocol to determine that messages they receive really have been created as part of the current run of the protocol. This is typically achieved by the inclusion in messages of data to bind messages to the current run. This data takes the form of numbers generated to be used only once (for bindings to the current run). These numbers used only once are commonly called nonces. If a principal generates a nonce for the cur-0-7803-7804-0 /03/$17.00 0 2003 IEEE rent protocol run and receives messages that contain it, this principal may deduce that these messages have been created after the nonce was generated. An alternative to nonces are timestamps, which can also allow the receiver to deduce that messages have been generated recently.
Basic Notation
The language of BAN consists of the following expressions:
Believes. The assertion PI= X means P believes the formula X. P may act as if X is true.
Sees. The assertion P U X means P sees X. Someone has sent a message containing X to P, and P can read and repeat X; this may require decryption.
Ofice Said. The assertion P 1-X means Ponce said X.
The principal P at some time sent a message including the statement X. It is known that P believed X when he sent the message.
Jurisdictiori. The assertion PI+ X means P has jurisdicrion over-X. The principal P is an authority on X and should be trusted on this matter. An example of jurisdiction is that principals may believe that a key distribution server hasjurisdiction over statements about the quality of keys.
The assertion # ( X ) means the formula X is fresh, that is to say, X has not been sent in a message at any'time before the current run of the protocol. This is usually true for nonces.
Key Goodness. The assertion P +% Q means K is a good key for communication between P and Q. The key K has not been revealed to any principal other than P or Q.
Fresh.
Public k q . The assertion A P stands for the principal P having a public key K . The matching secret key (denoted by K-') will never he revealed to any principal other than P. s
Secret.
The assertion P + Q means the formula X is a secret known only to P and Q, and possibly to principals trusted by them. Only P and Q may use X to prove their identities to one another. An example of a shared secret is a password. The assertion { X } I c means the formula X encrypted under the key K . Encrypted messages are uniquely readable and verifiable as such by holders of the right keys. Similarly. encrypted messages can only be created by a principal with the appropriate keys.
Combined. The assertion ( X ) y represents X combined with the formula Y ; it is intended that Y be a secret, and that its presence prove the identity of whoever utters (X),,.
Encrytion.
Inference Rules
When a principal receives a message, the logic provides inference rules that indicate what new beliefs this principal may infer from the message contents. The major inference rules are given below.
Message Meaning Rules
The message meaning rules explain how to derive beliefs about the origin of messages. Two of these concern the interpretation of encrypted messages.
That is, if principal P beliebes the key K is shared only with principal Q , and sees a message X encrypted under that key I<, then P may conclude that this message X was created by Q, who 'once said' its contents X . '
Similarly, for public keys:
PI=+%Q.PO{X},-I P I Q I -X That is, if principal P believes that the key 11' is Q's public key and it receives a message { X } K -l encrypted under Q's corresponding (private) inverse key K-'. then P may conclude that principal Q once said the contents of the message.
Nonce Verification Rule ] The nonce verification rule expresses how a principal's view of a message changes when it determines that the message is part of the current orotocol run.
PIE # ( X ) -P I , Q!-X PIzQI=X
That is. if P believes that X is fresh and that Q once said X , then P believes that Q has said X during the current run of protocol, and hence that Q believes X at present. In order to apply this rule, X should not contain any encrypted text. The nonce verification rule is the only way of 'promoting' once said assertion to actual belief.
Jurisdiction Rule
The jurisdiction rule captures the notion that some principals are trusted to carry out certain tasks and make particular judgments.
PI=QI=X:PI=Ql+S
That is, if principal P believes that Q believes X, and also believes that Q has jurisdiction over X , then P should believe X too.
In this paper, we also need some smaller rules such as the ability to deduce A I= # ( X , Y ) from A I= # ( X ) . But we shall omit these here. Further details of these inference rules can be found in Burrows, Abadi and Needham's paper [BAN89].
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Illustrative Example initial assumptions:
Figure 1: Initial assumptions, a goal and a feasible protocol Figure I gives a set of initial assumptions held by prin-'In BAN logic. it is assumed that principals can recognize messages they themselves have created and take appropriate action when they receive such a message.
cipal A and a key distribution server S, and a feasible protocol.
In this example, a principal A obtains the public key of another principal B from a key distribution server S. We start from a set of initial assumptions and intend to achieve the above goal. Firstly, as a trustworthy key distribution server, S believes that Ka really is A's public key, K b really is B's public key and K;' is its own private key. Secondly, the server's public key is known to A , otherwise the message A received from S is useless to A. Thirdly, A trusts 5' to provide B's public key, that is to say A believes that S has jurisdiction over B's public key. Finally, A also believcs that a particular number N, is a well-formed nonce which is actually fresh and that K;' is his own private key. The single goal of this protocol is for A to believe Kb is B's public key, i.e. A I= +L B , and so the protocol is a fragment of some key distribution protocol.
A believes I V~ is a well formed nonce and may include it in the first message. This message is encrypted with its private key IC;'. When the server S sees (or receives) this encrypted message, it can use A's public key to decrypt it and deduce A 1-N a , that is A once said N,, via the Message Meaning Rule. Now, S may reply to A with the second message that contains two of its current beliefs: the newly derived belief A once said N, and an initial assumption -B. S encrypts this message using its private key K;'. Once A sees this message, he may decrypt it to reveal its contents. Using the Message Meariing Rule, A con-
key. In the meantime, A may also conclude S I N A 1-N,,, that is, S once said that A once said N,. This message contains an assertion involving Na, a nonce A believes to he fresh, so A may conclude the whole message is a fresh one. Then A may deduce that S believes the whole message using the Nonce Verification Rule. In detail, A concludes SI= A 1-N, and also SI= d h B. Since A believes that S has jurisdiction over B's public key, A may now believe 3 B using the Jurisdicriori Rule.
A Search-based Strategy
What we wish to do is, given some assumptions and goals, to find protocols that achieve the goals from the assumptions. That is, we wish to search the space of feasible protocols for ones satisfying a specification. Any series of honest exchanges between two or more principals defines a feasible (with respect to the logic) protocol. This is the set of feasible protocols that we consider as the design space. It is clear that this space grows exponentially when the number of messages or the number of principals rise. The choices of the belief contents of messages introduce further combinatorial complexity. For a synthesis technique to be scalable it cannot he based on simple enumeration [CJOI] . Below we describe our general heuristic search-based approach to security protocol synthesis.
Interpreting a Message and a Move Function
A BAN protocol is represented as a sequence of A f messages, each of which is represented by an integer sequence. A message is sent by one principal and received by another. N principals, indexed 0 . . . N -1, participate in the protocol. Associated with each of the principals is a vector of its current beliefs. Each of the A4 messages is represented by B + 3 integers, v s , u r , v k , u b l , . . . , u b~. These represent the sender, the receiver, the key that the sender used to encrypt this message, and a series of B indices that reference beliefs currently held by the sending principal. So, the sender is us mod N; the receiver is vr mod N; the key is vk mod (2N + ( : ) ) (N principals may have N private keys, N public keys, and share (3 symmetric keys); and the first belief in the message is belief vbl mod T etc., where the sender has T current beliefs, indexed 0 . . . T -1. Belief 0 is the null belief (which allows us to model easily messages with fewer than B 'real' beliefs). The vector of the receiver's current beliefs is updated after each message is sent (see below). In this way, an arbitrary sequence of integers can be interpreted as a feasible protocol (senders only ever send beliefs they actually hold).
This allows a very simple move strategy for local search -simply randomly perturb any of the integers involved in any message. ' Although any integer sequence gives rise to a feasible protocol, the protocol may not satisfy our required goals. The fitness function below measures how close it comes to achieving the required goals and our search seeks to find a protocol that satisfies all these goals.
Interpreting a Protocol
This section shows how a random integer sequence can be decoded and executed as a protocol. Assume a protocol consists of A4 messages, each of which consists of C beliefs, and we start from the very beginning of this protocol. Firstly, we should initialize the belief state of the relevant principals involved in this protocol. Then, for each message in this protocol, we follow the steps below.
I . Determine the sender, receiver, and the key under which the current message is encrypted. If this key is an appropriate one for communication between the sender and the receiver, then proceed with the rest of the current message, else ignore this message and proceed to the next message. 4. Record the number of required goals achieved after this message has been analyzed.
Once a protocol has been executed in the above way, the fitness of this protocol can he calculated as given in the following section.
The Fitness Function
The fitness function is used to guide the search for a 'good' solution, that is, the fitness function must tell how 'good' a candidate solution is. We use fitness functions for a protocol of the form:
i=i
The wi are weightings and g; is the number of required goals achieved after message i. In this paper, we use several weighting strategies for setting the weights wi that are detailed in Table l . These weighting strategies were first used by Clark and Jacob. Here we only introduce these weighting strategies hriefly, furthcr details of these strategies can he found in [CJOO, Cl0ll. Note that the fitness function used rewards cumulatively '. If a goal becomes satisfied after some message it is also satisfied after all subsequent messages. Thus, the gi form a non-decreasing sequence.
The user specifies the number A t of messages in a protocol.
In the work reported here, we have limited ourselves to a maximum of seven messages.
Ear!\. Credit (EC).
The weights are monotonically decreasing with i. The notion is that satisfying goals early should he rewarded.
Ur~iform Credif (UC) . All the weights are the same.
Delayed Grm$cariori (DG). The weights are monotonically increasing. This captures the idea that early satisfaction of goals may not necessarily he a good thing. 
Uniform D e / q e d Crar$catiort (UDG). No credit is
given immediately for satisfyins goals in the initial exchanges and later weights are equal and positive.
Destinatiori Judgnterrt (Dl). Only the final weights are non-zero. It does not matter how you satisfy goals, the important thing is how many you satisfy in the end.
The fitness function is concerned only with satisfying the security goals. Protocols with identical fitness scores may well differ in other practically important ways. Some may he more efficient than others (e.g. need to communicate fewer distinguished beliefs in a message, need fewer messages, or require fewer interactions with a busy server). Inclusion of such efficiency criteria as part of the fitness function is currently under investigation.
Optimization Techniques
In this paper we have used the well-established technique of simulated annealing [KGV83], though our implementation allows rapid interchange of optimization techniques. The annealing approach is the standard one with a geometric cooling rate of 0.97. The number of attempted moves at each temperature was 400, with a maximum of 1000 iterations (temperature reductions) and maximum number of 50 consecutive unproductive iterations (i.e. with no move being accepted). In the interests of brevity we assume the audience is familiar with the standard annealing algorithm.
Experimental Method and Results
This section reports the results of applying the technique described above to the derivation of three-party key distribution protocols. The results consist of two aspects: the protocols and the success fractions. This section is organized hy different sorts of assumptions.
Public Key Protocol Example
Initial Assumptions Three principals involved in this key distribution protocol are A, B and S. As a key distribution 'Other approaches are possihlk.
server, S holds all the other principals' public keys and its own private key. A and B both have the server's public key and their own private keys. They also maintain their own nonces that they believe to he fresh. A and B each believes that S is to he trusted on the other's public key. All the assumptions are listed below.
Goals ' At the end of the protocol run, both A and B must believe that they hold each other's public key. The other two goals require that each of them believes the other believes its public key is good. carried out for each fitness function strategy. In our program, the annealing parameters given in section 2.4 were 'used. Figure 2 shows one of the public key protocols generated by the program. Figure 4 shows the success fractions of each predefined search strategy.
A / = B \ = t i i l , B I r A I = & B .
In the rest of this paper, only the core security relevant components of-a protocol are presented. That is, our descriptions of protocols do not include those belief components that do not contribute to the predefined goals. In addition, redundant beliefs (where the same beliefs are included twice or more in one message) have also been removed.
Currently, these 'junk' beliefs are removed by hand; automating their removal is under investigation. From an abstract logic point of view, the more beliefs included in messages the more information the receiving principal obtains. Thus, messages with more information create a greater probability of achieving goals. We have also repeated the above experiments allowing three beliefs per message. Figure 4 gives the success fractions when four and three beliefs per message are used. As we have seen, for the original problem, in all cases except for the destination judgment ( D J ) , the success fractions are decreased dramatically. Another conclusion w e can draw from these figures is that appropriate redundancy is actually very useful to the optimization approach. Moreover, D J is clearly aw-ful in both cases. Clearly, some degree of reward for early achievement is useful.
Public Key Protocol Example Using Timestamps
Initial Assumptions Similarly, three principals involved in this sort of key distribution protocol are A, B and S, where S is a trustworthy key distribution server. Here we allow the notion of timestamps. T is, effectively, a form of nonce shared by all patties prior IO the run of the protocol. The difference is this sort of protocol relies heavily on synchronized clocks, since each principal believes that a timestamp generated elsewhere is fresh (if it has a value within a window of the receiver's local time). 
S I = + % A , S I z -B , S I s -S , S I r T ,
x-'
IC, s I= #(T).
Goals We hope this sort of protocol can achieve the following four goals (same as before). 
AI= +% B, B
B .
Results a n d Statistics We use the same annealing parameters as those used in section 3.1. Figure 5 shows one of the protocols generated by our program, and figure 6 shows the success fraction for each search strategy when we allow four beliefs in each message. 
Hybrid Protocol Example
Initial Assumptions Essentially, we aim to distribute a secret key using public key means. In this sort of protocol, we assume that both principals A and B can communicate with the server S via a public key. The server S will distribute a symmetric session key that will he used in further communications between A and B. AI= BIr A Results a n d Statistics Figure 7 shows one of the hybrid protocols generated by the program. Figure 8 shows the success fraction for each search strategy when we allow four beliefs in one message. When considering protocols
The four desired goals are:
B, BI= A l r A U B. 
Extensive Experimentation
We have applied our approach to the on-line repository of security protocols "Security Protocols Open Reposilory" at http: / /w. lsv. ens-cachan. f r / spore/, which contains 45 protocols. Our program successfully synthesized 38 BAN protocols when given the same initial assumptions and goals a s they are in the original ones. Ohviously. all these 18 protocols are correct according to the BAN logic; and the successful synthesis process itself is a proof. The remaining 7 sets of assumptions and goals contain features outside of the BAN logic, and so our tool cannot he used. There are several "variations on a
theme" in the library. Often, the assumptions and goals of these variants are the same. Thus, there may be one abstract specification and several concrete implementations. The 38 concrete protocols correspond to 23 distinct abstract specifications. Experimentation highlighted difficulties with repeated authentication. The logic (and so our tools) has difficulties with the use of repeated 'tickets'. We simply evolved protocols to meet the goals of the first authentication run. It is generally possible to address the repeated parts of the protocol. provided each presentation of a ticket is regarded as 'fresh enough' (or simply 'fresh') if its lifetime has not expired. With such an approach, the evolution of mutual authenticating nonce exchanees is often trivial but the modelling can he somewhat unnatural. This area clearly requires further investigation. One interesting feature of the work is the sheer speed at which protocols are generated. A typical run took two minutes or less (on a 1.2 GH2 Pentium processor). This compares. very favourahly with other design synthesis approaches, e.g. model checking approaches [PSOOa, PSOOb] .
Conclusions and Further Work
The ahove work shows that the original Clark-Jacob approach can be successfully extended to allow public key and hybrid cryptographic schemes. The protocols generated, although simple, are typical abstractions of protocols in the literature. The ease with which the approach generated protocols satisfying realistic goals merits further investigation of the technique. However. experimentation and our general knowledge of protocol verification techniques have allowed us to identify numerous possible improvements to the approach and tool support. These are outlined below.
A more sophisticated logic ( W O seems a promising candidate) should be adopted to increase design choice and give greater confidence in the practical security of evolved protocols. As far as actual freedom from security flaws is concerned, we are very much at the mercy of the logic we choose. We have expanded the previously used subset of BAN logic to allow public key and hybrid protocols to be evolved. We need now to address weaknesses in the BAN logic itself. Similarly, allowing more sophisticated beliefs to he communicated in messages should allow a widerrange of protocols to he evolved. Non-functional properties such as efficiency are an important consideration for most security protocol designers and should he incorporated into our design synthesis approach. Efficiency has not been ignored completely in the current approach -the cumulative reward nature of the fitness function generally favours shorter protocols -hut this is somewhat indirect and does not address crucial issues such as amount of encryption etc. Automatic refinement to a more detailed represenlation (code, for example) would he a significant enhancement and would greatly facilitate inclusion of non-functional issues.
Experience shows that we may need to lever every ounce of potential out of the approach taken. The model checking approaches [PSOOa, PSOOb] are distinctly limited, e.g. three or four messages, in the size of the protocols they can produce. In this paper we have presented seven-message protocols and some nine-message protocols were demonstrated by Clark and Jacob [CJOI] . We currently do not know the limits of the optimization approaches. Earlier work [CJOI] showed that the protocol generation problem can he highly non-linear. As the complexity of the underlying logic increases, so does the magnitude of the search problem. Simulated annealing and genetic algorithms may not he the best optimization techniques to use. Others should be considered.
The work here shows that meta-heuristic search approaches to secure protocol synthesis are potentially powerful and have the benefit of being rapid. Our tools could generate candidate protocols rapidly and concrete refinements of them could be subjected to more detailed and sophisticated analysis (such as that provided by current model checking approaches). This would provide an interesting synthesis of current techniques.
Our experiments have tested the approach's ability to generate protocols for existing and fairly standard requirements. It seems suited to such tasks. It will he interesting to see whether meta-heuristic approaches will he able to produce protocols for novel or highly complex requirements. 
